Background
Microsoft cybersecurity negligence is at the center of a growing political storm. In September 2025, U.S. Senator Ron Wyden formally requested that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) investigate Microsoft, citing weak default configurations and outdated encryption. The issues originate from Microsoft’s use of outdated encryption standards and weak default configurations, which Wyden says expose millions of Americans and critical infrastructure to cybersecurity threats. (Reuters, 2025).
The Ascension Health Ransomware Breach
Legislators view this incident as a striking example of Microsoft’s cybersecurity negligence, as insecure defaults facilitated a massive healthcare ransomware attack.
Ascension stands as one of the largest nonprofit healthcare systems in the United States, managing over 2,600 care facilities across 19 states, which encompass hospitals, clinics, pharmacies, and senior living centers. Due to its extensive reach and the highly sensitive medical data it manages, Ascension is considered part of the nation’s critical healthcare infrastructure.
The 2024 incident revealed that a contractor clicked on a malicious Bing search result, giving attackers initial access. This entry point enabled hackers to penetrate Microsoft Active Directory environments, exploiting default security configurations. The attackers compromised core IT infrastructure by escalating privileges and moving laterally across systems.
The Ascension ransomware incident is now viewed by policymakers as a clear example of Microsoft cybersecurity negligence, since weak default configurations contributed to the compromise of 5.6 million patient records
There were severe consequences:
Impacts on Patients: The breach made the personal, medical, and insurance information of about 5.6 million patients public, which increased the risk of identity theft and scams.
Disruptions to operations: Hospitals and offices connected to Ascension’s network had trouble with scheduling, diagnostic tests, and getting to electronic health records. Some facilities had to revert to paper-based processes to continue patient care.
Financial Impact: Recovering from ransomware, restoring data, regulatory probes, and lawsuits all added up to big costs that may end up hurting both the healthcare provider and the patients.
Concerns about national security: the event showed how flaws in widely used business software, like Microsoft’s Active Directory, can affect entire sectors of critical infrastructure.
This case demonstrates how a single misstep—such as failing to change insecure defaults—can cascade into a nationwide crisis affecting millions of people. (Reuters, 2025).
Core Issues Identified
Inadequate Default Configuration
Numerous Microsoft products, including Windows Server and Active Directory, are set up with default configurations that prioritize compatibility and ease of deployment. This indicates that legacy systems and applications can function with minimal configuration.
The drawback is that these defaults often disable security measures or utilize outdated protocols for backward compatibility. Unless IT teams proactively harden specific configurations, hackers may exploit those vulnerabilities. For instance, IT teams frequently leave permissive access controls, outdated authentication techniques, and weak password policies in place by default.
This is important because, in large organizations, default settings are often not modified across all systems. Attackers are aware of this and actively scan for systems that are operating with insecure configurations.
Obsolete Encryption (RC4)
RC4 (Rivest Cipher 4) is a stream cipher encryption technique that was introduced in 1987. For years, cryptographers extensively utilized it to safeguard internet traffic, Wi-Fi (WEP), and Microsoft authentication. Subsequently, cryptographers demonstrated that RC4 possesses significant vulnerabilities: it reveals patterns in encrypted data, enabling attackers to retrieve plaintext information without the encryption key. Consequently, RC4 is considered “cryptographically compromised.”
Microsoft continues to permit RC4 in certain Active Directory authentication contexts, mostly to accommodate legacy applications. This presents an opportunity for attackers to compromise Kerberos tickets or other encrypted communications with significantly reduced effort compared to contemporary encryption standards.
The significance lies in the fact that, although only a small percentage of systems use RC4, this percentage may represent the most vulnerable component. Attackers need only one vulnerable access point.
Risks Associated with Kerberoasting
Kerberos is the default authentication mechanism of Microsoft, utilized to verify the identities of users and services within an Active Directory domain. It generates “tickets” that enable users to access resources without repeatedly entering their password.
Kerberoasting is a technique where attackers request a service ticket for a user account that runs a service (often with elevated privileges). The ticket is encrypted using the account’s password hash. If that account has a weak or guessable password, attackers can take the ticket offline and attempt to crack it using brute-force or dictionary attacks.
Upon breaching the system, the attacker obtains the password of the service account and can escalate their privileges, sometimes gaining access to domain administrator accounts.
Why it matters: Kerberoasting is a preferred method for ransomware groups because it operates discreetly within legitimate authentication processes. When combined with weak encryption methods, such as RC4, or poor password policies, the success of Kerberoasting becomes even easier and faster.
Critics argue that supporting outdated encryption like RC4 is part of a pattern of Microsoft cybersecurity negligence.”
Microsoft’s Response
Microsoft acknowledged that RC4 is outdated but noted that it accounts for less than 0.1% of traffic. The company committed to disabling RC4 by default starting in 2026 and introducing additional security mitigations in Windows products (Reuters, 2025).
Although Microsoft promised to disable RC4 by 2026, security experts see the slow timeline as further evidence of Microsoft cybersecurity negligence in addressing critical vulnerabilities.
Lessons Learned
The Ascension breach reinforces that Microsoft cybersecurity negligence can cascade into nationwide crises when insecure defaults remain unchanged. The following lessons can be drawn from the above mentioned incident.
- Enabling Security by Default: Vendors should ship products with strong security settings enabled by default, minimizing the need for manual hardening.
- Backward Compatibility vs. Security: While supporting outdated protocols may benefit older systems, it also creates systemic risks.
- User Awareness: Even a single click on a malicious link can trigger a large-scale compromise, highlighting the importance of the human factor in cybersecurity.
Recommended Actions for Organizations
- Review and Harden Defaults: Disable vulnerable legacy protocols, enforce strong Kerberos configurations, and strengthen the policies of Active Directory.
- Regular Security Audits: Conduct configuration reviews and penetration tests to identify misconfigurations before they can be exploited by attackers.
- Ensure the readiness and testing of ransomware playbooks, backups, and disaster recovery strategies through incident response planning.
- Patch and Update Promptly: Stay updated on Microsoft’s security alerts and implement vendor-recommended mitigations immediately.
Precautions for End Users
- Be Cautious Online: Avoid clicking on suspicious links, even if they appear in search results from trusted search engines.
- Enable Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): Adds an extra layer of security against credential theft.
- Apply Updates: Ensure that operating systems, browsers, and security tools are kept fully patched.
- Awareness Training: Users should be trained to recognize phishing attempts and malicious links.
Conclusion
The FTC probe could reshape accountability standards, making Microsoft’s cybersecurity negligence a turning point in regulatory oversight. ” The demand for an FTC probe into Microsoft highlights a larger issue in cybersecurity: how to balance the need for legacy compatibility with the principle of being “secure by default.” The Ascension breach should remind people, companies, and governments that default settings aren’t always safe and that they need to take extra steps to protect themselves. Microsoft has said they will add security to their systems, but companies shouldn’t wait until 2026 to do so.
The FTC’s potential probe may finally hold Microsoft accountable, making Microsoft cybersecurity negligence a landmark case for regulation and corporate responsibility in cybersecurity.
References
https://thehackernews.com/2025/09/senator-wyden-urges-ftc-to-probe.html
https://thecyberskills.com/cyber-threats-guide-2025/
https://thecyberskills.com/cyber-attack-case-studies/
